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COMMENTS
TRANSFERS OF STOCK PURSUANT TO POST-MARITAL
PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS- A TAXABLE
"EXCHANGE" IN COMMON-LAW JURISDICTIONS
In 1954, a taxpayer entered into a voluntary property settlement
with his wife in anticipation of divorce proceedings. In part, the
agreement called for support payments to the wife and minor child
in the amount of $550 per month. It further called for, as a "divi-
sion in settlement of their property," an immediate transfer by the
husband to the wife of 500 shares of DuPont stock.
Agreeing to accept this division in "full settlement and satis-
faction of any and all claims and rights against the husband whatso-
ever (including but not by way of limitation, dower and all rights
under the laws of testacy and intestacy),"1 the wife then instituted
proceedings for divorce. The entire agreement was incorporated
into the decree of the divorce court and the marriage was dissolved.
The laws of Delaware, where both parties were domiciled, pro-
vided that upon divorce the wife shall be entitled to such share of
her husband's real and personal property as the court thinks rea-
sonable.2 As to rights of intestate succession, it provided that the
wife shall be entitled to a share of her husband's personal estate "if
the intestate is married at the time of his or her death."3 It further
declares that the "widow of any man" shall have rights of dower
in all lands of which her husband was seised at any time during
the marriage "unless she shall have relinquished her right of
dower therein by her own voluntary act.' 4
Also pertinent to the transaction were certain sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 61 defines "gross income"
as income "from whatever source derived" and includes specifically
income from discharge of indebtedness.5 Section 1001 directs that
'Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1191 (1962).
2DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1531 (1953).
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 512 (Supp. 1960).
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 901 (1953); In re Lamonica's Real Estate, 16
Del. Ch. 458, 462, 141 Atl. 315, 317 (1928): "[T]he dower right of a
married woman is a valuable right or interest in the real estate of
which her husband was seized during coverture, constituting an in-
cumbrance on the husband's title and of which right she may not be
divested except by her death before the husband or by her own volun-
tary act or deed."
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (12): "Section 61-Gross Income Defined.
(a) General Definition. - Except as otherwise provided in this sub-
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gain from the sale or disposition of property shall be computed
by subtracting the adjusted basis from the amount realized.6 Most
imporfant from the standpoint of marital property settlements is
the statutory definition of "amount realized": 7
(b) Amount Realized.-The amount [of gain] realized from the
sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money
received plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, treating the property
settlement as an exchange of stock involving a taxable gain, noti-
fied the husband of a deficiency. After payment of the tax, the
husband filed his claim for refund which, when disallowed, re-
sulted in suit for its recovery. The Court of Claims, wherein the
action was commenced, gave judgment to the taxpayer, holding the
transaction non-taxable because of the impossibility of attributing
a fair market value to the property received by him.8 On petition
for writ of certiorari, the case was taken to the Supreme Court
for final adjudication.9
Held: The agreement must be treated as a taxable exchange.
Since the wife had no rights of co-ownership in the property trans-
ferred to her by the husband, the agreement could not be given the
non-taxability afforded a similar transaction in community property
states. The "property" received by the husband was the release of
the wife's claims against him, and because of the impossibility of
attributing a fair market value to such "property," his realized gain
must be determined by referring to the fair market value of the
stock transferred.10
Owing to the complexity of the issue, a consideration of its
title gross income means all income from whatever source derived, in-
cluding (but not limited to) the following items: ...
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness."
6INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(a): "Section 1001 - Determination of
Amount and Recognition of Gain or Loss:
(a) Computation of Gain or Loss. - The gain from the sale or other
disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized there-
from over the adjusted basis .... .
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (b). (Emphasis added.)
8 Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
9 Davis v. United States, cert. granted, 368 U.S. 813 (1961).
10 Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190 (1962). Other questions decided
by the Court were the wife's basis for the property received and the
deductibility of the wife's legal expenses incurred in the divorce pro-
ceedings on the return of the husband. However, this note will discuss
only that part of the Court's decision dealing with the taxability of the
transfer of stock pursuant to the marriage settlement.
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past is warranted before its analysis. Although previous cases in-
volved similar facts, their decisions are limited to narrower con-
siderations than those found in Davis. As will be seen, a new and
creditable argument was presented in Davis, not mentioned in the
previous cases dealing with the same problem, in order to settle
the question on which the lower federal courts had split.
The taxability of a post-nuptial property settlement first arose
in 1940 in Mesta v. Commissioner." In that case a wife amended a
divorce libel originally brought for a divorce from bed and board
"and for such alimony as her husband's circumstances will permit"
to a libel for an absolute divorce, wherein no claim for alimony
was made. In consideration for her amendment, the husband agreed
to transfer to her a number of shares of appreciated stock, along
with certain other personal property. The Board of Tax Appeals
held the transaction not taxable due to the impossibility of deter-
mining the fair market value of the property received by the hus-
band.12
While the appeal of the Mesta case was pending, Halliwell v.
Commissioner13 was decided by the Board. There the taxpayer had
entered into an agreement with his wife whereby he would transfer
to her for alimony and support "a lump sum, consisting of certain
securities and cash" in exchange for the wife's release of all claims
against him. The agreement was subject to the approval of the
divorce court, and, when the divorce was awarded, it was found
that the securities and cash were a reasonable portion of the hus-
band's estate to be assigned to the wife in compliance with the terms
of their agreement. The taxpayer was then directed to transfer the
appreciated stock to his wife pursuant to the decree of the court.
Relying on its holding in the Mesta case, the Board held that be-
cause of the impossibility of measuring the fair market value of
the property received by the husband, there was no way to com-
pute the amount realized by him on the transfer as the basis for
his taxable gain.14
"142 B.T.A. 933 (1940).
12 Id. at 940. "What is the measure of the value of the wife's right to
maintenance and support? It is dependent upon many factors-the
financial success or failure of the husband, his generosity, the thrift or
acquisitiveness of the wife, the length of life of both parties, the rise
and fall of markets.... We are of the opinion that the impossibility of
evaluating the rights received by the husband constitutes an insur-
mountable obstacle to the application of section 22(e) in conjunction
with section 111(b) .... 
13 44 B.T.A. 740 (1941).
14 Id. at 746. "Our decision on the ... question is controlled by L. W. Mesta
... which differs in no material respect from the case presently before
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Subsequently, however, the decision of the Mesta case was re-
versed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 15 on which
basis the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
decision of Halliwell.16 Both reversals were grounded upon the
idea that they were the last step taken by the taxpayer by which
he "obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has already
accrued to him."'1 7 The Mesta court recognized that the "fair mar-
ket value of the property . . .received by [the taxpayer] for the
stock may be difficult to ascertain," but concluded that the gain
must be computed by using the fair market value of the property
transferred in accordance with "the practical assumption that a
man who spends money or gives property of a fixed value for an
unliquidated claim is getting his money's worth."' 8
It is to be noted that in both Mesta and Halliwell the conten-
tions were presented that the agreements constituted no more than
a division or partition of property between husband and wife. In-
deed, the Board of Tax Appeals in both cases utilized that argu-
ment in holding the transactions non-taxable. 19 Unfortunately, how-
ever, in neither case can be found the argument that to recognize
a taxable gain from such transactions would result in geographical
disparity in the application of the tax laws, since a similar agree-
ment in community property states would be a non-taxable division
of property between co-owners. Such a contention would have sub-
stantiated the holdings of the Board, and might well have altered
the courts' conclusions, at least in Halliwell. There the court recog-
nized, even though to a limited extent, that the transaction could
us." At 748: 'In the present case, it is also impossible to evaluate the
rights received by petitioner . . . and thus to compute the amount
realized by him on the transfer of the specified securities and the small
amount of cash ......
15Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
695 (1941), rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 704 (1942).
'
8 Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642, 643 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 741 (1942): "In all essential respects the case is the same as
Commissioner v. Mesta, 3 Cir., 123 F.2d 986. With that decision we agree."
17 Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1941), quoting from
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131
F.2d 642, 643 (2d Cir. 1942): "His use of [the securities] to discharge
his obligations of support to his wife and child was a disposition which
enabled him to realize the enhancement in value which the securities
sustained during his ownership of them."
18 Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir. 1941).
19Halliwell v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 740, 749 (1941); Mesta v. Com-
missioner, 42 B.T.A. 933, 941 (1940).
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be called a "division of property."20 Had the disparity issue been
presented, we might have been left with more than the concise re-
liance on Mesta.
Thus, upon the authority of two federal courts the matter
seemed well-settled, at least for a period of about eighteen years.
Then, in 1960, in Commissioner v. Marshman,21 the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, on a comparable set of facts, affirmed a de-
cision of the Tax Court 22 in favor of the taxpayer. The court held
the transaction non-taxable, not only because of the impossibility
of measuring the fair market value of the property received by the
taxpayer, but also because of the basic unfairness, contrary to the
intent of Congress in drafting Section 111 (b) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939,2 in attempting to measure the value of some-
thing given by the value of something received.24
With the law on this subject in a state of conflict, and further
complicated by the decision of the Court of Claims in the Davis
case,25 which was in accordance with the decision in Marshman,26
the Supreme Court in deciding Davis was faced with the task of
resolving the issue once and for all.
In reaching its decision in Davis, the Supreme Court went one
step further than the lower federal courts and divided the tax-
ability of the transaction into two distinct questions: (1) Should a
property settlement between a husband and wife pursuant to a
divorce proceeding be classified as a taxable event at all, and (2) if
so, what is to be the basis of the "property" received by the husband,
i.e., can his gain be measured by the fair market value of the prop-
erty transferred, rather than the fair market value of the property
received?2 7 Such a distinction was made necessary by the policy
20 Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642, 643 (2d Cir. 1942).
21279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960).
22 Marshman v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 269 (1958).
23 IxT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 2, § ll1(b), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 1001(b)).
24 Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 918 (1960). See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
25 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
26 Id. at 174. "We think as did the court in Marshman . . . that the
measurement of gain cannot be the fair market value of the property
transferred. We also believe, as did the court in Marshman, that the
measure of the value of the wife's right to maintenance and support
was dependent upon so many uncertain factors that neither the tax-
payer nor a revenue officer could do more than guess at it."
27 See Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1191 (1962).
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argument of the taxpayer that the Court should not inject geo-
graphical disparity into a system of nationwide taxation.
II.
The first question warranting consideration in determining
whether the transaction constituted a taxable event under Section
1001 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is whether the tax-
payer received "money or property" as part of his "amount realized"
on the sale or disposition of his own property. Apparently the
Court regarded this determination as unimportant, or as evident
from the facts and unworthy of elaboration. Although it speaks
of the holdings in the lower courts on whether the taxpayer actually
received property in exchange for his stock, it reserves its own
solution until the latter part of its opinion. After the ultimate con-
clusion is reached, and the transaction is held to constitute a taxable
event, the Court proceeds to resolve the "property" issue. Just as
a release from a pre-existing debt or other obligation is valid con-
sideration for the transfer of money or property in satisfaction
thereof, we are told that the "property received" by the husband
in this case was the "release of the wife's inchoate marital rights. '28
The agreement by Mrs. Davis to accept the stock in "full settlement
and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against the hus-
band"'29 was the valuable property received in the exchange,30 thus
making the transaction taxable to the extent of the gain.
But, can it really be said in a situation involving tax conse-
quences that one actually receives property by virtue of a release
from a legal obligation? It might be argued that upon the execution
of the release, the rights of the wife against the husband and the
corresponding obligation of the husband are thereby extinguished,
and thus the "property" never reaches the husband's hands. A
waiver of rights by one should not freely be construed as a trans-
fer and receipt of such rights by another. The rights of the wife
and legal obligation of the husband, being extinguished by the re-
lease, should not be said to inure to the husband as property re-
ceived, much less as his amount realized, for tax purposes.
In reaching its conclusion as to whether the situation should
28 Id. at 1194.
29 See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
30 The Court's reasoning is paralleled in Migdal, The Lump Sum Divorce
Settlement as a Taxable Exchange, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 593, 595 (1961):
"Moreover, the receipt of intangible economic benefit is sufficient to
satisfy the property requirement," thus making the transaction taxable to
the extent of the gain.
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be classified as a taxable event, the Court was forced to realize
that a decision in favor of the government would result in tax-law
disparity between common-law and community-property jurisdic-
tions,31 an argument not propounded in either Mesta, Halliwell, or
Marshman. However, the Court disposes of this argument and holds
the transaction taxable by examining the interests of the wife under
Delaware law and concluding that since such interests are not
the equivalent of co-ownership per se 32 they are not deserving of
the tax treatment afforded spouses in community-property states.33
The necessity of adherence to fact in application of the tax law
can be appreciated, but the manner in which the Court disposes
of the issue of disparity between common-law and community-prop-
erty jurisdictions seems unjustifiable. Surely such a malignancy
as geographical discrimination under the taxing statutes is worthy
of more profound reasoning and extended discussion before it is
made the law of the land. Not only does the Court attempt to
minimize the issue, but ultimately disposes of it through the ra-
tionalization that "the facts of life are still with us. 3 4 Apparently
it is ignoring the intent of Congress33 in adopting the sweeping
changes in the Revenue Act of 194836 in order to equalize the tax
burden between the two jurisdictions, as well as its own holding
when speaking of the estate tax in Helvering v. Hallock: 7 "[T]he
importation of these distinctions and controversies from the law
of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes a
fair and workable tax system."
It is to be noted that counsel for the taxpayer was arguing not
that the interests of the Delaware wife were the equivalent of co-
31 "Although admittedly such a view may permit different tax treatment
among the several States, this Court in the past has not ignored the
differing effects on the federal taxing scheme of substantive differences
between community property and common-law systems." Davis v.
United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1193 (1962).
32 "Delaware seems only to place a burden on the husband's property
rather than to make the wife a part owner thereof." Ibid.
33 "The effectuation of these marital rights may ultimately result in the
ownership of some of the husband's property as it did here, but
certainly this happenstance does not equate the transaction with a
division of property by co-owners." Ibid.
34Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1193 (1962).
35See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
36 Compare § 51(a) and (b) of INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 51 (a) and
(b), 53 Stat. 27, with § 303 of REVENUE ACT OF 1948, ch. 168, § 303, 62
Stat. 115.
37 309 U.S. 106, 118 (1940).
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ownership, but only that they sufficiently resembled co-ownership
to be afforded the same tax treatment, in view of Congress' intent
of uniformity in tax law application.38 In the typical community-
property state, the husband and wife are deemed, during the mar-
riage itself, "equal and present owners of the common property."
' 9
The wife acquires a present interest in one-half of the husband's
property from the moment it is acquired by him, 40 and thus upon
dissolution of the marriage the husband may transfer to her that
one-half of the community property which was acquired by her
at its original acquisition.41 And since the transaction is merely a
transfer of that property already owned, a division of property be-
tween co-owners, it gives rise to no taxable gain under the income
tax statutes.
42
But in Davis, the wife had rights of dower and intestate suc-
cession to personalty upon the death of her husband, coupled with
rights of "reasonable share" to his real and personal property upon
divorce.43 It is conceded that the Court is correct in its statement
that these rights do not "reach the dignity of co-ownership, ' 44 but a
closer examination and comparison may reveal sufficient similari-
ties to justify equal tax treatment under the revenue laws.
That a wife in a community-property jurisdiction has a present,
vested right (in common-law terminology) in one-half of her hus-
band's property seems irrebuttable by the Court's own holding.4'5
38 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 9-13.
39 1 DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 271 (1943).
40 "[H]er ownership and possession in half of these earnings and gains
did not depend upon any mere physical fact of placing the earnings or
gains in the husband's hands but related, just as the husband's owner-
ship did, to the very inception of the right to such earnings and gains."
Id. at 162.
41 Id. at 658.
42 Where "in exchange for a vested undivided one-half interest in the
whole, each party receives a vested interest in the whole of one-half,
obviously there would be no resulting taxable gain and no change in
basis of any of the property by reason of the settlement." C. C. Rouse,
6 T.C. 908, 914, aff'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947). See Taylor and
Swartz, Tax Aspects of Marital Property Agreements, 7 TAx L. REv. 19,
52-58 (1951); Wren, Tax Problems Incident to Divorce and Property
Settlement, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 665, 687 (1961).
43 See notes 2-4 supra.
44 Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1193 (1962).
45 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 (1930): "[I]t is clear the wife has ...
a vested property right in the community property, equal with that
of her husband; and in the income of the community, including salaries
or wages of either husband or wife, or both."
COMMENTS
In many common-law states, however, dower is also regarded as
a vested right.40 Moreover, under statutes in some states the dower
right vests completely upon divorce. At such time what may have
been regarded as an inchoate interest becomes absolute, and the
wife is entitled to dower in her husband's land to the same extent
as if he were dead. 47
Furthermore, in the absence of statute in certain states, a
wife's dower rights are so secure that not even a divorce for her
own misconduct will terminate them.48 Delaware, on the other
hand, provides that a wife's dower right can only be forfeited by
killing her husband, her own adultery, or by her own voluntary
act of relinquishment.49 Thus it seems that a divorce in Delaware
upon any other ground than the wife's adultery is insufficient to
divest her of the dower rights she possesses in her husband's realty.
It may be said, therefore, that the line between the solidarity of a
wife's rights in a community-property state and those of a wife in
Delaware, the jurisdiction determining the rights of the parties in
the Davis case, seems very thin indeed.
46 "A wife's inchoate right of dower is a vested right which vests at the
time of marriage in property then owned by her husband. In property
subsequently acquired by the husband this right vests at the time of
the acquisition concurrently with the vesting of the title in the husband."
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lewis, 276 Ky. 263, 268, 124 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1939).
See, e.g, Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312, 50 N.E. 650 (1898); Gerhardt v.
Sullivan, 107 N.J. Eq. 374, 152 Atl. 663 (Ch. 1930); Class v. Strack, 85 N.J.
Eq. 319, 96 Atl. 405 (Ch. 1915).
47 "[W]hen a divorce is decreed to the wife for the fault of the husband
... she shall have dower in his real estate, to be recovered and assigned
to her as if he were dead." McAllister v. Dexter & Piscataquis R.R.,
106 Me. 371, 377, 76 Atl. 891, 894 (1910). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1531 (1953); cf. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2 Carter (Ind.) 233(1850); Tatro v. Tatro, 18 Neb. 395, 25 N.W. 571 (1895). See generally 28
C.J.S. Dower §§ 47, 53 (1951).
48
"f ower is an estate in the land fixed by marriage and death of the
husband. It is not dependent upon either the wife's conduct nor her
residence, and . .. is not waived by her misconduct or abandonment
of her husband." Swift v. Reasonover, 168 Tenn. 305, 308, 77 S.W.2d 809,
810 (1934); accord, Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934); Lakin
v. Lakin, 83 Mass. (2 Allen) 45 (1861); Cogswell v. Tibbetts, 3 N.H. 41(1924).
49DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 901 (1953); DEL. CODE ANx. tit. 12, § 908 (1953).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1531 provides that upon divorce the wife may
be entitled to such share of her husband's real property as the court
thinks reasonable. However, tit. 13, § 1532 provides that she shall forfeit
any estate settled upon her in lieu of dower when the cause of the
divorce is her own adultery. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying
text. Cf. Walter v. Walter, 136 A.2d 202 (Del. 1957); In re Lamonica's
Real Estate, 5 Del. Ch. 458, 141 Atl. 315 (1928).
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As to the right of intestate succession to personal property, the
Court in Davis correctly points out that in Delaware the wife must
survive the husband to share in his intestate estate.50 But, con-
sidering the facts of the case, this portion of Delaware law must
also be read with the statute pertaining to the wife's rights upon
divorce. There we find that the wife is to receive that portion of
the husband's real and personal estate as the court thinks reason-
able, considering whether the divorce is being asked for the ag-
gression of the husband or wife.51 Again property rights of a
"contingent" or "inchoate" nature vest completely upon a mere
voluntary act of the spouses (the procurement of the divorce), and
may be divided by judicial direction according to their respective
guilt or innocence.
Comparing this to community property law, we find similar
provisions: 52
[I]n a considerable number of the states, the statutes authorize
the court to divide the community property between the spouses
in such proportions as it shall, from the facts of the case, deemjust and right. This allows the courts to take into consideration
the respective situations of the spouses, as well as the situation of
the children, and also allows the courts to consider the respective
innocence and guilt of the spouses in deciding how to divide the
community property.
On the one hand, then, we have a system of property law
which makes the wife the present owner of one-half of the common
property at the moment it is acquired. However, upon the institu-
tion of divorce proceedings, it is the court which determines the
amount of her share, from a consideration of the factual situation.
On the other hand, we have a system of property law, as in Davis,
where although the rights of the wife are not "vested" in all cases,
they can become vested by the mere institution of a divorce action.
And here again it is the divorce court which may determine the
extent to which these vested rights may be lessened or increased.
In one system the wife acquires her rights at an earlier date than
50 "Her rights are not descendable, and she must survive him to share in
his intestate estate." Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1193 (1962).
51 "When a divorce shall be decreed for the aggression of the husband,
the complainant shall be restored to all her real estate, and allowed,
out of her husband's real and personal estate, such share as the court
thinks reasonable; but if the divorce be for the wife's aggression, the
court may restore the whole or a part of her real estate, and also such
share of her husband's personal property as seems reasonable." DEL.
CODE ANN. fit. 13, § 1531 (1953).
52 1 DEFUNiAK, op. cit. supra note 39, at 643.
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in the other, but in both jurisdictions the rights of each are subject
to alteration by the divorce court.
Furthermore, both systems generally allow spouses contemplat-
ing divorce or separation to enter into agreements providing for the
disposition of their property. Here also their respective rights
under the laws of either system may be changed or modified by
voluntary act.
In many of the [community property] states in which they can do
so, they may, prior to separation or prior to the institution of
divorce proceedings by one of the spouses, enter into a valid
property settlement providing for the partition or disposition
of the community property already acquired.53
Therefore, in a common-law jurisdiction, where the property
settlement might also include satisfaction of the wife's right to
inherit,54 as it did in Davis, "the transaction would [likewise] seem
to constitute a division of property from which no gain is realized.'" 5
Accordingly, there seems to be sufficient resemblance between the
wife's rights under the two systems that, even though not identical,
equal treatment under the tax laws would be justified. To counter
the argument that the wife has an interest ab initio in her husband's
property (acquired during coverture) in a community property
state, it might be answered that
the amount to which the wife is entitled by virtue of her property
rights [in a common-law state] depends only upon the value of the
husband's property; thus the wife shares the benefit of any ap-
preciation in the property to an extent fixed by her dower or other
statutory rights.56
Thus, noting the similarities between common-law and com-
munity property jurisdictions in respect to post-marital property
settlements, one may wonder why the Court in Davis chose the
road it did. To rest a decision on technical grounds, by holding that
the wife's rights in her husband's property were not co-ownership
53 Id. at 658. 2 AmERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.35 (1952).
54 "The law is too well settled in this state to admit of dispute that husband
and wife, in contemplation of a separation and divorce, may, by valid
contract between themselves, settle and adjust all property rights
growing out of the marital relation, including the wife's right of dower
and claim for alimony, support, and maintenance." North v. North, 339
Mo. 1226, 1230, 100 S.W.2d 582, 584 (1927); see Fischer v. Leach, 124 Kan.
97, 258 Pac. 295, cert. denied, 276 U.S. 618 (1927); Young v. Watson,
3 Ky. Op. 210 (1869).
55 Note, Gains and Losses on Sales and Exchanges-Transfer of Appreciated
Property in Divorce Settlement Results in No Taxable Gains, 74 HAMll.
L. Rv. 1226, 1227 (1961).
Is Ibid. See generally 28 C.J.S. Dower § 56 (1941).
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per se, without an acceptable consideration of the resulting in-
equalities in its application, is to foster hostility to the tax laws.
The Court concedes for a moment that "it would [not] be com-
pletely illogical to consider the shearing off of the wife's rights in
her husband's property as a division of that property,"57 but con-
cludes by saying "we believe the contrary to be the more reason-
able construction."-5' Possibly "the contrary" is the correct answer
within its vacuum of the facts of Davis, but perhaps the Court "was
more concerned with legal doctrine than it was with economic
realities." 59 And in the light of history, the decision seems irre-
concilable with Congress' attempt to eliminate geographical dis-
parity for purposes of income, estate, and gift taxes.60
Prior to 1948, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
had issued a series of decisions which resulted in income tax dis-
crimination in favor of community property states.61 The effect of
these was various attempts by several state legislatures to uproot
firmly embedded systems of common law,6 2 as well as attempts by
individuals to invent clever legal devices which would circumvent
the application of the tax laws6 3 in order to obtain the same ad-
vantages enjoyed by residents of community property states. In
1948, to put an end to the existing disorder surrounding income taxa-
tion, Congress evidenced its intent to have the tax law apply equally
57Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1193 (1962).
58 Ibid.
59 Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 50 (1944) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60 See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
61 Married persons in community property states were allowed to split
their income so that each spouse would be liable for the tax on one-half
the total income, whereas spouses in common-law states were liable for
the tax computed on the aggregate of their combined income. See Poe
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930);
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118(1930); Helvering v. Campbell, 139 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1944); Commis-
sioner v. Hart, 76 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1935); Helvering v. Hickman, 70
F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1934).
0 2"After one false start, Oklahoma joined the community property group
[already consisting of eight states] in 1945. Oregon, Michigan, Nebraska,
and Pennsylvania were added to the list in 1947." Equalization of Tax
Burdens on Residents of Community Property and Common-Law States,
S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE CONG. SEar. 1184, 1186
(1948).
63 "Chief among these devices are gifts, either outright or in trust, joint
tenancies, and family partnerships. Confusion has resulted from at-
tempts to use trusts, tenancies, and partnerships for such purposes, and
the present state of the law and regulations on these points is most
unsatisfactory." Id. at 1185.
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throughout the nation by making vast changes in the then existing
revenue laws.64 The Senate Report on the Revenue Act of 1948 is
illuminating: 65
Many states are waiting to see what Congress will do about
the problem of geographical equalization. If the necessary action
is not taken, there will be a flood of State legislation intended to
produce the same results, but doing so in a manner which has most
unfortunate consequences, not only for the taxpayer involved, but
also for all the persons who must use or administer the property
laws of the States which rush into the community-property system.
Your committee believes that the best answer to the problem
of geographical equalization is the splitting of the combined income
of the husband and wife.... Income splitting will produce the same
result in common-law States which now obtains in a community
property State when the entire income of both spouses is com-
munity income.
Therefore, one wonders why the main issue in the Davis case
was not the resulting disparity between the two jurisdictions,
rather than that of the co-ownership per se of Mrs. Davis in her
husband's property. The Court seems to dispose of the issue by cir-
cumventing it, and in deciding the question of whether the trans-
action constituted a taxable event, ignores what should have been
the primary consideration in its determination. At any rate, what
the Court did hold was that the rights of Mrs. Davis were not those
of a co-owner,66 and consequently the agreement could not be af-
forded the same non-taxability as a similar agreement in a com-
munity property state.67 That the Court saw no need to further
treat the "disparity" issue seems at least regrettable. Even though
it could have tossed the entire solution into the lap of Congress by
saying that the application of the revenue laws must be based on
the dictates of the statute as well as present facts, it chose not to
do so. Instead, our prejudices against tax-law discrimination are
quelled by the statement that "the facts of life are still with us."08
III.
Having settled the question of whether the transaction was a
taxable event at all, the Court then turned to the issue that was
the basis of the dissension in the lower federal courts. With the
64 See note 38 supra.
65 Equalization of Tax Burdens on Residents of Community Property and
Common-Law States, S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. SEmv. 1184, 1186 (1948).
66 Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1193 (1962).
67 Id. at 1194.
68 Id. at 1193.
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holdings of Mesta and HalliweUl, courts directly opposed to those
of Marshman and Davis, the question of the taxability of post-
marital property settlements was ripe for final determination. Al-
though the contention of geographical disparity was never pre-
sented in any of the lower courts, the Court of Claims in Davis6 9 held
the transaction non-taxable, as did the Court of Appeals in Marsh-
man"0 because of the impossibility of attributing a fair market value
to the "property" received by the husband in the exchange.
Contrary to what might be expected, these latter conclusions
do not presuppose the recognition of taxable gain, but they do pre-
suppose the recognition of economic gain. As the Supreme Court
itself has said, "admittedly not all economic gain is taxable in-
come."71 Thus, even though it may be conceded that realization of
economic gain may occur without the receipt of actual cash or
property of monetary value, as where the "last step is taken by
which [the taxpayer] obtains the fruition of the economic gain
which has already accrued to him,"7 2 we might draw a line of
distinction by saying that only realized gain based on a measurable
fair market value falls into the category of taxable gain.73 It
would seem to follow, then, that it was this impossibility of at-
tributing a fair market value to the property received by the tax-
payer that led two of the lower federal courts to treat it as a non-
taxable gain, even though it might have involved a realized eco-
nomic gain within the meaning of Section 1001 (b) .74 In other words,
economic gain, although realized, should not be held to be taxable
609 Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See note 25 supra.
70 "[T]he impossibility of evaluating the 'fair market value of the property
(other than money) received' by the husband from the wife in the
property settlement entered into between them, constitutes an in-
surmountable obstacle to the application of Section 22f [now Section
1001 (a) and (b) I." Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27, 34 (6th Cir.
1960).
7 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940).
72 Ibid.
73 "[I]t is essential that property received have an exchangeable value,
a market value, in order that it may be considered as income and taxable.
... [I]t has frequently been held, or assumed, that no taxable income
arises in respect of an exchange of property, unless the property re-
ceived by the taxpayer had a market value at the time of the trans-
action." Annot., Income Tax in Respect of Exchange of Properties, 102
AJL.R. 6, 18 (1936). See cases collected at page 18.
74 Cf. Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1961): '"f the
'property' received by Davis had no fair market value, or if none has
been shown, it may be economic gain but it is not taxable gain by
reason of the express provision of section 1001 (b)."
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gain unless the economic gain has in itself a measurable fair market
value upon which the tax can be assessed.
Furthermore, one federal court fortified its decision in holding
that no taxable gain existed by precise adherence to the language
of the statute: 75
We do not think that this problem is correctly solved by giving to
those rights the value of the property which is given in exchange.
Section 111 (b) requires that the capital gain be measured by the
fair market value of the property -received by the taxpayer, not
by the fair market value of the property transferred by the tax-in
exchange for the property received. To say that the fair market
value of the property received is the same as the fair market value
of the property given up not only ignores realities, but is the use of
a formula which is radically different from the well-established
and well-recognized formula approved by the courts for determin-
ing fair market value.7 6
These arguments were rejected by the Supreme Court, how-
ever, on the theory that the husband and wife had negotiated an
"arms-length" transaction, which was justification for the premise
that they judged the rights relinquished by the wife as precisely
equal to the value of the stock transferred by the husband.77 To
support its explanation, the Court cites three lower federal court
cases 78 as examples of situations where the fair market value of
"the two properties exchanged in an arms-length transaction are
either equal in fact or are presumed to be equal. ' 79
It is to be noted, however, that even though one of the cases
cited was decided by the same court that decided Marshman, the
results are not necessarily inconsistent. In each of the cases cited
by the Court the transaction was of a general business nature,
accomplished in a commercial setting, with a more readily iden-
7 5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 2, § 111(b), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 1001 (b) ).
76 Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27, 32 (6th Cir. 1960).
77 "It must be assumed, we think, that the parties acted at arm's length and
that they judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the property
for which they were exchanged." Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct.
1190, 1194 (1962).
78Ibid., citing United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir.
1960) (land transferred to employee's retirement trust fund in exchange
for improved employee relations and morale); International Freighting
Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943) (stock given to em-
ployees as a bonus for their past services); Philadelphia Park Amuse-
ment Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (bridge trans-
ferred in exchange for a street railway franchise).
79Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1194 (1962), quoting Phila-
delphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, supra note 78.
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tifiable point of reference for valuation. Thus, even though the
property received by the taxpayer may have been intangible
in each case, it was more easily reduced to a dollar and cents
value than the marital rights of the wife in Davis. The absence
of a business atmosphere, coupled with the psychological and
emotional factors involved in a divorce proceeding, would seem
to necessarily negate the application of the arms-length test to
determine the value of the "property" received.
"Fair market value" has been defined as "the price at which
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell."80
Evidently the Court is not disturbed in attributing a fair market
value to the release received by the husband by calling it an "arms-
length" transaction. It proceeds to apply the test notwithstanding
that a divorce proceeding is far from a commercial negotiation. It
recognizes that divorce and property settlements are often plagued
by emotion and tension,81 as did the court in Marshman,82 but
falls short of saying that these, together with whatever premium
the husband is willing to pay to have the marriage terminated,
are sufficient to destroy the equality of values presumption. An
even further consideration, making the applicability of the arms-
length test at least doubtful in these post-nuptial property settle-
ments, is that the
valuation of the wife's claims by reference to the value of the
property transferred requires that the property be transferred
solely in exchange for the claims. However, the total value of the
securities transferred in a lump sum marital settlement may not
represent, or even approximate, the true value of the claims re-
8 0 Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27, 32 (6th Cir. 1960). See, e.g.,
In re Williams, 256 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1958); Fitts v. Commissioner, 237
F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1956); Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.
1934); Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 94 S.W. 860 (1906).
81 '"To be sure there is much to be said of the argument that such an as-
sumption is weakened by the emotion, tension and practical necessities
involved in divorce negotiations and the property settlements arising
therefrom." Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1194 (1962).
82 "Under such conditions [the emotional strains of a divorce settlement],
values are lost sight of, concessions are made, one does not expect or
insist upon getting his money's worth for what he gives up. Unfortu-
nately, it is often the case that what a husband transfers to his wife in a
so-called property settlement in a pending divorce action is not given
merely in exchange for a release of alimony and dower rights, but also
includes, without being so labeled, such additional amount as the hus-
band may be willing to pay in order to have the marriage status
terminated .... The value of what is given up is no criterion of the
fair market value of the 'property' received." Commissioner v. Marsh-
man, 279 F.2d 27, 32 (6th Cir. 1960).
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linquished, even though some gain is realized because property of
some value is received in partial exchange therefor.83
An alternative method for evaluating the release of the support
rights as "property" to the husband has been suggested, which,
while requiring more effort, appears more realistic than ascribing
to the entire lot of marital rights the total value of the property
transferred: 84
The allocation between the value of W's support rights and her
marital property rights is accomplished by deducting from the
value of the total property transferred the value of her right to
support. The value of her right to support has been measured by
the Actuaries' or Combined Experience Table of Mortality with
interest at four per cent per year ... where chances of remarriage
were not involved.
If the property settlement for her support, however, is to termi-
nate upon W's remarriage, this factor must also be taken into con-
sideration in computing the present value of her support rights.
... In such a reduction of the value of support rights by this re-
marriage factor, actuarial tables prepared by insurance companies
handling workmen's compensation claims were approved.
The author further states that the value of the right to support
may also be measured by a consideration of the circumstances at
the time of the divorce or separation.8 5 The question of valuation
thereby becomes one of fact, the factual proof consisting of the
showing of his income and station in life, as well as the circum-
stances of the wife. Moreover, such a factual determination may
even be left to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.8 6
Consequently, if the Supreme Court was seeking to prevent
marital property settlements in common law states from escaping
taxation, it could have employed either of these methods as a more
acceptable formula in attributing a valuation to the property re-
ceived by the husband. Even though such techniques would leave
unanswered the value of the wife's dower rights, even a partially
realistic approach is better than one which disregards the facts.
At least the entire lot of marital rights released would not be
lumped together for speculative judicial valuation.
To these arguments could be added the once-established rule
of law, as utilized in the Marshman case,8 7 that taxing statutes are
83 Note, The Valuation of "Property Received" In a Marital Settlement
Which Includes a Release of Marital Obligations, 7 How. L.J. 64 (1961).
84 BAYLY, TAX MANUAL FOR DIVORCE AND SEPARATION 228 (1953).
85 Id. at 227.
86 Ibid., referring to ET 19, 1946-2 Cum. BuLL. 166, 169 (1946).
S7 See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
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to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer. "In case of doubt
[taxing statutes] are construed most strongly against the Govern-
ment, and in favor of the citizen."88 This doctrine, however, has
been substantially modified, in that:8 9
It is the function and duty of courts to resolve doubts. We know
of no reason why that function should be abdicated in a tax case
more than in any other where the rights of suitors turn on the con-
struction of a statute and it is our duty to decide what that con-
struction fairly should be.
But even so, the Supreme Court is employing an unrestricted
form of statutory construction, disregarding that duty of "fair
interpretation," when, as in Davis, it unreservedly lifts the word
"received" out of the statute and substitutes therefore its exact
antonym, "transferred. 90
However, the Court again justifies its conclusion through
rationalization, by asserting that although accurate measurement
of the fair market value is difficult, it is better to make a "rough
approximation." 9' It is difficult to appreciate, in any case where
property is sought to be subjected to taxation, why a rough approxi-
mation would ever be justified. But here we are told that other-
wise the gain would either escape taxation altogether, or the burden
would be unjustly shifted to the wife. Nevertheless, the opinion
of the American Law Institute is to the contrary: 92
Since marital settlements, in a sense, are involuntary exchanges
it seems undesirable to impose a tax at that time. However, all
88 Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); see, e.g., United States v. Merriam,
263 U.S. 179 (1923); Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U.S.
602 (1922); United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921); Haiku Sugar Co.
v. Johnstone, 249 Fed. 103 (9th Cir. 1918); Baltimore Talking Board Co.
v. Miles, 280 Fed. 658 (4th Cir. 1908); Hubbard-Ragsdale Co. v. Dean,
15 F.2d 410 (S.D. Ohio 1926); Cleveland Provision Co. v. Weiss, 4 F.2d
408 (N.D. Ohio 1925).
89 White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938); see Burnet v. Guggen-
heim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1933); Commissioner v. Morris, 90 F.2d 962 (2d
Cir. 1937).
90 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 (b) states that the "amount realized from
the sale or other disposition of property shall be the . . . fair market
value of the property (other than money) received."
91 Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1194 (1962).
921 ALl FED. INCOME TAX STAT. § X257 (a) at 368 (Feb. 1954 Draft). The
proposed statute is entitled "Recognition of Gain and Loss on Transfer of
Property In a Marital Settlement," and states:
(a) General Rule. No gain or loss shall be recognized with respect to
property transferred in a marital settlement ....
(b) Definition of Marital Settlement. - 'Marital settlement" means a
transfer of property made pursuant to an ante-nuptial agreement,
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property transferred in a marital settlement will retain its old
basis, so that any potential gain of the transferred property (or
potential loss) remains unchanged. .... Recognizing gain or loss
would require valuation of the transferred property, including the
valuation of support rights. The suggested rule avoids the necessity
for this valuation.
Finally, in examining Davis, one is led to the question of exactly
what it was that the Court was evaluating when it spoke of the
"arms-length" test. To what is it seeking to attribute the fair mar-
ket value of the stock transferred by the husband? Or, more specifi-
cally, "does the Davis case cover only transfers of appreciated
property in return for the release of support rights, or does it also
include the transfer of property in satisfaction of the right to in-
herit?"93
Whether the Supreme Court in its evaluation of the property
received by the husband is including all three rights of the wife
mentioned in its statement of facts, whether it is eliminating the
dower rights, or whether it is considering any one alone or any
two together, are questions seemingly left to legal conjecture.
IV.
These and other questions arise to provoke the curiosity of tax
and divorce lawyers as a result of the Davis case. Because the
Supreme Court has unhesitatingly projected itself into so nebulous
an area as the income tax consequences of marital property settle-
ments in different jurisdictions, and because of the manner in
which it disposes of the problems in Davis, the answers are at least
vague.
As to which rights the Court was evaluating, the difficulty
readily presents itself when we note that "the Court in referring
to the release of the wife's inchoate marital rights apparently makes
no distinction in the particular nature of those rights and would
regard the transfer of property as a taxable event in either case". 94
In its statement of the facts, the Court points out that the rights
of the wife include intestate succession, dower, and reasonable share
separation agreement, legal separation, divorce, or annulment of
marriage, if the transfer was made because of the marital relation-
ship or because of the obligation to support a minor child. Id.
at 114.
93 Comment on Davis v. United States, CCH CURRENT LAW AND PRACTICE 783
(1962).
94 Ibid.
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upon divorce.9 5 However, the Court also states that the agreement
called for "support payments to the wife and minor child in addition
to the transfer of certain personal property to the wife."9 (Emphasis
added.) The Court of Claims describes this even further, showing
that the support obligation called for a payment of $550 per month
to the wife, and was contained in a paragraph quite separate from
that calling for the transfer of the stock.9 7 But in the remainder
of its opinion, the Supreme Court refers only to the "wife's interest"
or the "wife's rights,"9 8 and in its discussion of fair market value
states that the "property received" by the husband was the release
of the wife's "inchoate marital rights."99
It might be contended that the issue of support rights is ruled
out of the decision altogether because of the Court's statement
that the satisfaction of such rights was in addition to the transfer
of the stock.10 0 On the other hand, if one is to conclude from the
opinion that the Court is treating the agreement as a whole, i.e.,
support rights, intestate succession rights, and dower rights, the
result would not seem harmonious with the treatment of the com-
munity property question.
As previously stated, a wife has, in the community property
states, an undivided interest in one-half of the husband's property
instead of a right to inherit or rights of intestate succession.' 0 ' Thus,
if the opinion were construed to include a release from only support
or alimony, the Court's handling of the community property issue
would seem unnecessary, since a transfer of stock in an exchange
involving the release of alimony or support claims in a community
property jurisdiction would necessarily include the transfer of some
of the stock in exchange for the alimony and support rights. Con-
sequently, it could not be wholly classified as a division of the
common property, and would also have to constitute a taxable event
to the extent of the excess. 0 2 For example, if in a community
property state the husband, concurrently with the division of
95 Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1191 (1962).
96 Ibid.
97 Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168, 173 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
98 Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1193 (1962).
99 Id. at 1194.
100 Id. at 1191.
101 1 DEFUMAX, PRIn CILES OF ComvuNrrY PROPERTY 271 (1943).
102 "It would therefore appear that a community property settlement,
which does not constitute a true partition . . . will ultimately be held
to constitute a taxable event." Taylor and Schwartz, Tax Aspects of
Marital Property Agreements, 7 TAx L. REV. 19, 58 (1951).
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property, secures a release from his wife of all claims for alimony
and support against him, in exchange for which he transfers to her
three-fourths of the community property, or other separate property
of his own, the transaction would seem clearly to constitute a
partially taxable event under the income tax statute.103
If, however, the opinion is to be limited to transfers in-
volving a release of the wife's rights to inherit, the question then
arises as to what happens in a jurisdiction where such inchoate
rights are terminated upon divorce. 04 Clearly, if such rights are
terminated by the divorce decree, the wife has nothing to transfer
to the husband in exchange for the stock, and he therefore would
receive no property in the exchange. Such a transaction would
probably be treated, assuming no support rights are involved, as
taxable only to the wife under the laws of gift taxes.0 5
Conversely, where the inchoate rights are terminated upon
divorce, and the wife releases her husband from the obligation
of support and alimony in exchange for his transfer to her of the
stock, the "property" received by the husband would seem to be
more readily measurable by a fair market value. As noted earlier,
the court could attribute a value to such rights by taking into con-
sideration the husband's station in life, the wife's life expectancy,
the number of children, and the circumstances for which the divorce
was granted. 00 Thus, no need would be present to resort to the
market value of the stock transferred to determine the extent of
103 "The cases which have dealt with unequal divisions of community
property in divorce or separation agreements have held that any gain
from such transactions will be fully recognized." Id. at 56. "[W]here
there is an unequal division of the community property or where the
husband transfers a large amount of cash to the wife for her share of
the community, there is a taxable transaction." Wren, Tax Problems
Incident to Divorce and Property Settlement, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 665, 687
(1961). See Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949); Rouse v. Conunissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th
Cir. 1947); Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943).
104 See, e.g., Hamm v. Butler, 215 Ala. 572, 112 So. 141 (1927); Gwynn v.
Rush, 143 Ark. 4, 219 S.W. 339 (1920); Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192
N.E. 668 (1934); Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Ore. 442, 215
Pac. 501 (1923).
105 "To the extent that the husband transfers securities to his wife in a
lump sum marital settlement which exceed in value the amount of the
monetary claims relinquished by the wife, such excess would properly
appear to constitute, for income tax purposes, a gift." Note, The Valua-
tion of "Property Received" In a Marital Settlement Which Includes a
Release of Marital Obligations, 7 How. L.J. 64, 70 (1961).
106 See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
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the husband's gain, and the inequitable application of the "arms-
length" test in a divorce settlement would be avoided.
If the argument that the Court is dealing with only the wife's
rights to dower and intestate succession can be upheld, it would
seem that the Mesta case is distinguishable. In Mesta the property
was transferred by the husband in exchange for the partitioning
of a tenancy by the entirety and for a release from alimony and
support claims.107 The partitioning of a tenancy by the entirety
would seem to constitute even more of a division of property be-
tween co-owners than the transaction in the Davis case, thus lead-
ing to the conclusion that the only thing the Mesta court was evalu-
ating was the release of alimony and support claims. Clearly, such
a transaction would seem more capable of valuation than the one
in Davis, for as stated previously, support rights may be evaluated
by considering the facts surrounding the divorce proceedings.
Thus, the result of the Mesta case may be correct even though
its reasoning may be disclaimed. By disposing of the test which
the Mesta court used for valuation of the husband's "property"
received, i.e., the arm's-length test, we are still left with more
realistic methods of evaluating the same property in order to arrive
at the same conclusion of taxability. No justification can be found,
therefore, for applying the arm's-length test in either Mesta or
Davis, whether we consider the latter opinion as including all the
claims released by the wife, or only those claims to dower and
intestate succession. Such a technique, however applicable in com-
mercial transactions, simply has no place in the taxation of post-
nuptial property settlements.
The Halliwell case may also be distinguished. In Davis, the
Supreme Court applied the arm's-length test in order to evaluate
the worth of the "property" received by the husband, despite its
own admissions as to the emotion and tension involved in such a
transaction. 0 8 In the Halliwell case, however, it was the divorce
court which determined the amount and value of the stock to be
transferred by the husband in exchange for the wife's release. 0 9 It
was left for the court to determine the extent to which the husband
should pay in order for the exchange to be equal, in the light of the
circumstances of the case. 110 The emotions, tensions, and extra-
premiums paid by the husband, which prevent the fair application
of the arm's-length test, were not involved.
10 7 Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 987 (3d Cir. 1941).
108 Davis v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 1190, 1194 (1962).
10 ) 0 Halliwell v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 740, 743 (1941).
110 Ibid.
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The same result, then, as reached by the Halliwell Court of
Appeals, i.e., holding the transaction taxable, can also be reached
by disposing of the arm's-length test altogether. The amount and
value of the "property" to be received by the husband, against which
his tax would be assessed, and also that to be transferred to the
wife pursuant to their agreement, was determined by a disassociated
third party. No need was present, in order to arrive at a valuation,
to resort to the inappropriate presumption, as did the Supreme
Court in Davis, that the parties themselves adjudged their rights
to be equal, a presumption which must be considered fallacious
in view of the extraneous psychological factors permeating the
transaction.
The "arm's-length" test itself will undoubtedly require close
scrutiny in future marital property settlements. In community
property situations and tenancies by the entirety, wherein the
husband also seeks to extinguish the wife's claim to support or
alimony, the application of the arm's length test to the entire lot
of property transferred might be avoided by leaving it to the divorce
court to determine such right, as in Haliiwell,"' or by computing
their worth through either of the methods previously suggested.112
As to other property settlements in common law states, however,
the pattern is obscure. If unusual compulsion can remove a trans-
action from the common definition of fair market value," 3 it would
seem that only the same is needed to take a property settlement
out of the arm's length test. But since the Supreme Court in Davis
decided that the emotion and tension involved therein were not
sufficient for such removal, the extent required can only be left
to speculation.
One may also wonder what the Court would do with the arm's-
length test in a property settlement where the stock transferred
had no readily ascertainable market value. For example, if the
stock transferred were that of a closed corporation undergoing
corporate reorganization, or part of a new issue not yet released,
what would be the value of the "property" received by the husband
in the exchange?" 4 Would the Court be forced to treat such a situa-
tion as a non-taxable event?
11 Ibid.
112 See notes 84 and 85 supra and accompanying text.
"3 See, e.g., Williams v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1958); Fraser
Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 1252 (1928); Acme Mills, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1065 (1927); Albert M. Slater, 28 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 486 (1959).
114For examples of situations where stock has no readily ascertainable fair
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The question also arises as to whether the husband would be
allowed a deduction for losses sustained on the transfer of de-
preciated stock pursuant to such a marital settlement. Should he be
allowed to use the market value of the stock transferred as the
"amount realized" on the exchange, and thus deduct this amount
from his adjusted basis? If the stock is transferred prior to the
divorce decree, it is evident that the loss would be disallowed under
Section 267.115 However, if the stock is transferred after a decree
absolutely dissolving the marital relationship, the results are not
clear.
CONCLUSION
The question of the taxability of post-marital property settle-
ments involving the transfer of appreciated stock has been answered
by our highest tribunal. But the ramifications of its opinion are
likely to extend considerably beyond what one might expect from
only a cursory reading of this case. Through Davis, the Supreme
Court has once again, as in the early thirties, applied the revenue
laws in a manner which results in geographical discrimination. The
ensuing disparity, as well as the intent of Congress to eliminate tax
inequality between community property and common-law jurisdic-
tions, has been minimized in order to achieve a result of question-
able compatibility with the laws of one state. To be sure, the issues
of the case must be considered through the facts, i.e., the elements
of ownership involved, but it is submitted that overriding these are
basic principles of fairness and equality which necessarily underlie
any system of effective taxation. Discrimination breeds hostility,
but even more so when created with open indifference. The Court
has, moreover, applied a method of valuation which, although work-
able to an uncertain extent in particular situations, defies equitable
application in circumstances where excessive emotions and tensions
predominate. The field of post-marital property settlements has no
room for the application of the arm's length test. However, the
Court has made its decision. Federal legislation can provide the
remedy.
Bruce B. Graves, '64
market value, see generally Champlin v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 23 (10th
Cir. 1934); Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1930); O'Meara v.
Commissioner, 34 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1929); Reynolds v. Durey, 9 F.
Supp. 553 (N.D.N.Y. 1934); Ault & Wiborg Co. v. Commissioner, 17
B.T.A. 665 (1929); Parker v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1185 (1929).
115 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 267.
